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dc.contributor.authorOttonelli V
dc.contributor.authorPorello D
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-08T09:35:19Z
dc.date.available2018-08-08T09:35:19Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.issn1470-594X
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594X11433742
dc.identifier.urihttp://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1470594X11433742
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10863/5676
dc.description.abstractPublic deliberation has been defended as a rational and noncoercive way to overcome paradoxical results from democratic voting, by promoting consensus on the available alternatives on the political agenda. Some critics have argued that full consensus is too demanding and inimical to pluralism and have pointed out that single-peakedness, a much less stringent condition, is sufficient to overcome voting paradoxes. According to these accounts, deliberation can induce single-peakedness through the creation of a 'meta-agreement', that is, agreement on the dimension according to which the issues at stake are 'conceptualized'. We argue here that once all the conditions needed for deliberation to bring about single-peakedness through meta-agreement are unpacked and made explicit, meta-agreement turns out to be a highly demanding condition, and one that is very inhospitable to pluralism.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSAGE PUBLICATIONS INCen_US
dc.rights
dc.subjectSingle-peakednessen_US
dc.subjectDeliberationen_US
dc.subjectConsensusen_US
dc.subjectPluralismen_US
dc.subjectMeta-agreementen_US
dc.titleOn the elusive notion of meta-agreementen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.date.updated2018-08-08T09:29:13Z
dc.language.isiEN-GB
dc.journal.titlePolitics, Philosophy and Economics
dc.description.fulltextopenen_US


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