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dc.contributor.authorPorello D
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-07T08:32:25Z
dc.date.available2018-08-07T08:32:25Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn0048-3893
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9259-4
dc.identifier.urihttps://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-010-9259-4
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10863/5656
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I discuss the analysis of logic in the pragmatic approach recently proposed by Brandom. I consider different consequence relations, formalized by classical, intuitionistic and linear logic, and I will argue that the formal theory developed by Brandom, even if provides powerful foundational insights on the relationship between logic and discursive practices, cannot account for important reasoning patterns represented by non-monotonic or resource-sensitive inferences. Then, I will present an incompatibility semantics in the framework of linear logic which allow to refine Brandom's concept of defeasible inference and to account for those non-monotonic and relevant inferences that are expressible in linear logic. Moreover, I will suggest an interpretation of discursive practices based on an abstract notion of agreement on what counts as a reason which is deeply connected with linear logic semantics.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSPRINGERen_US
dc.rights
dc.subjectLinear logicen_US
dc.subjectActions that count as reasonsen_US
dc.subjectAnalytical pragmatismen_US
dc.subjectDialoguesen_US
dc.titleIncompatibility Semantics from Agreementen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.date.updated2018-08-06T15:03:50Z
dc.language.isiEN-GB
dc.journal.titlePhilosophia
dc.description.fulltextopenen_US


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