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dc.contributor.authorFedele A
dc.contributor.authorNaticchioni P
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-01T09:22:46Z
dc.date.available2018-08-01T09:22:46Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.issn1465-6485
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12072
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10863/5379
dc.description.abstractWe study self-selection into politics and effort once in office of citizens with different abilities and motivations in a framework where moonlighting is allowed. We find that high-ability motivated (public-fit) politicians exert higher effort in politics than high-ability non-motivated (market-fit) politicians, and that high-ability citizens, both public-fit and market-fit, may decide to enter politics. We test our predictions using a database of Italian parliamentarians for the period 1996–2006. We find evidence of advantageous selection of both market-fit and public-fit parliamentarians. We also show that public-fit parliamentarians have higher voting attendance and that only voting attendance of market-fit parliamentarians is negatively affected by income opportunities.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.rights
dc.titleMoonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters!en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.date.updated2018-05-16T07:37:29Z
dc.language.isiEN-GB
dc.journal.titleGerman Economic Review
dc.description.fulltextreserveden_US


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