Il disegno di riforma costituzionale Renzi-Boschi e i suoi riflessi sulle autonomie speciali tra tendenze centralistiche, clausola di maggior favore e principio dell’intesa
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The article focuses on the impact of the constitutional reforms on the Italian Regions having a special statute, and advocates that the Italian Parliament has not shown any strategy in their normative set up, with negative effects on the system of legal sources. This is true, in the first place, with the constitutional reforms, which have taken place in the years 1999-2001. They have touched only indirectly on the Regions with a special status, as it was assumed that such statutes would be reformed soon. However, this has not happened yet. A similar assessment can be made on the basis of the text of the constitutional bill presented by the Government in April 2014 (so-called Renzi-Boschi Reform). While expressing a clear centralizing intent vis-à-vis Regions with ordinary statutes (as shown by the introduction of the limits of national interest and legal or economic unity, and the abolition of the so-called State-Regions concurrent powers), the reform is not going to affect the Regions with a special statute. This is going to remain so until the special statutes will be updated, on the basis of agreements which will be stipulated between the State and the Regions with special statutes (and autonomous Provinces). While examining the consequences that such reform could have on the powers of the Special Regions the article advocates that it implies the abrogation of the so-called “most favour clause” applied so far to Regions with a special statute and the return to special Statutes. The last part is dedicated to the concept of “agreement” and its meaning for the revision procedure of special statutes.