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dc.contributor.authorFedele A
dc.contributor.authorNaticchioni P
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-20T14:10:13Z
dc.date.available2016-12-20T14:10:13Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.urihttp://pro1.unibz.it/projects/economics/repec/bemps08.pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10863/1681
dc.descriptionIZA Discussion Paper no. 7500en_US
dc.description.abstractWe study self-selection into politics and commitment once in office of citizens with different abilities and motivations in a framework where moonlighting is allowed. We find that high-ability motivated (public-fit) politicians are more committed to political activity than high-ability non-motivated (market-fit) politicians, and that high-ability citizens, both public-fit and market-fit, may decide to enter politics. We test our predictions using a database of Italian parliamentarians for the period 1996-2006. We find evidence of advantageous selection of both market-fit and public-fit parliamentarians. We also show that public-fit parliamentarians are more committed in terms of voting attendance and that only the commitment of market-fit parliamentarians is negatively affected by income opportunities.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBolzano/Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series (BEMPS);8
dc.subjectSECS-P/01en_US
dc.subjectSECS-P/02en_US
dc.titleMoonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters!en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.date.updated2016-12-16T07:51:04Z
dc.journal.titleBolzano/Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series (BEMPS)
dc.description.fulltextopenen_US


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