Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters!
MetadataShow full item record
We study self-selection into politics and commitment once in office of citizens with different abilities and motivations in a framework where moonlighting is allowed. We find that high-ability motivated (public-fit) politicians are more committed to political activity than high-ability non-motivated (market-fit) politicians, and that high-ability citizens, both public-fit and market-fit, may decide to enter politics. We test our predictions using a database of Italian parliamentarians for the period 1996-2006. We find evidence of advantageous selection of both market-fit and public-fit parliamentarians. We also show that public-fit parliamentarians are more committed in terms of voting attendance and that only the commitment of market-fit parliamentarians is negatively affected by income opportunities.
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
Roberti P (2019)This paper analyzes a model of electoral competition with uncertainty on the policy implemented by candidates. I show that this uncertainty can induce risk-averse voters to elect politicians whose policies are biased. I ...
Chesterley N; Roberti P (Elsevier B.V., 2018)This paper analyzes the relationship between populism and institutional capture. Populist politicians provide voters with a utility boom followed by a subsequent bust. Non-populists provide a constant level of utility. ...
Bellettini G; Roberti P (Springer New York LLC, 2019)We model a society that values coherence between the long-term commitment of politicians to given levels of public good provision and current policy. In that context, we suggest a novel mechanism by which issuing government ...