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dc.contributor.authorLevaggi L
dc.contributor.authorLevaggi R
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-15T11:03:47Z
dc.date.available2019-10-15T11:03:47Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.siepweb.it/siep/images/joomd/1494929366Levaggi_Levaggi_WP_SIEP_723.pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://bia.unibz.it/handle/10863/11073
dc.descriptionSIEP Working Paper n. 723en_US
dc.description.abstractCompetition in the market for health care has followed different patterns, and some health care systems have opted for mixed markets where public organisations compete alongside private ones.  Empirical evidences on these market structures are however mixed.  In this article we argue that public hospitals which have different objectives than private ones and faces different constraints, are also perceived differently by patients.  For this reason we model the market for hospital care as Salop circle with a centre where the  public  hospital  is  located;  private  providers  are  located  on  the  circle. We show that,  depending on the difference in the productivity advantage, mixed markets may outperform both the benchmark (one public hospital at the centre) and private competition (N private providers competing along the  circle),  but  the  welfare  distribution  of  these  improvements  should  be carefully analysed. In some cases monopoly franchise on the mixed market should be introduced to redistribute these benefits.en_US
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation
dc.rights
dc.titleOligopolistic competition for the provision of hospital careen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.date.updated2019-09-29T03:20:21Z
dc.language.isiEN-GB
dc.description.fulltextnoneen_US


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