Abstract
This article examines the judicial review used by the CJEU in assessing the ECB’s non-standard monetary policy measures and the dispute between the German Constitutional Court and the CJEU over the standard of review to be used. In addition, it discusses the possibility of a future clash between the two courts in the post Covid-19 era. It first analyses the type of judicial con- trol carried out by the CJEU during the Euro crisis in the Gauweiler and Weiss cases. It then explores the reasons for criticism of the CJEU reasoning by the doctrine. During the pandemic period the ECB has taken unprecedented steps and increased its monetary policy instruments, such as the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP). The potential confrontation between the GCC and the ECB over PEPP is, however, deemed limited. It concludes analysing the possibility to add a court-appointed expert to the CJEU’s decision-making process. Indeed, the presence of an expert could improve judicial review and increase the depth of the judgments also against national courts that have asked for preliminary ruling. However, the independence of the ECB should not be affected.