Abstract
Sommario:
1. Introduction. – 2. The alternative nature of SPACs’ capital-raising. – 3. The regulatory framework of Italian SPACs. – 3.1. The securities regulation and disclosure environment. – 3.2. The company law regime and the incentive structure. – 4. The empirical analysis. – 4.1. Data collection and sample description. – 4.2. Descriptive statistics on the average AIM Italia SPAC. – 4.2.1. Warrants. – 4.2.2. The role of sponsors/promotori. – 4.3. SPACs’ investment patterns between institutional and retail investors. – 4.3.1 Retail investor participation. – 4.3.2. Institutional investor participation. – 4.3.3. Warrants trading of institutional and retail investors. – 4.4. The cost structure of AIM Italia SPACs. – 4.4.1 Statistics on AIM Italia SPACs cost structure. – 4.5. The long-run performance of the listed entity resulting from the business combination. – 5. Some short policy reflections on material and disclosure rules. – 6. Conclusions.
Abstract:
L’Articolo esamina innanzitutto il contesto normativo, in particolare il diritto societario e mobiliare, che definisce la struttura di incentivi per un campione di 24 SPAC (Special Purpose Acquisition Companies) AIM Italia dal 2011 al 2023. La ricerca pone poi tre domande empiriche riguardanti il grado di partecipazione degli investitori istituzionali rispetto a quelli retail nel mercato secondario delle AIM Italia SPAC, la dimensione della loro struttura dei costi e la performance di lungo periodo del prezzo delle azioni (su periodi di uno, due e tre anni) delle entità risultanti dalla business combination dalla data effettiva della stessa. I risultati rivelano che gli investitori retail, sebbene esclusi dalle IPO delle SPAC, sono attivamente coinvolti nel trading delle azioni SPAC sul mercato secondario, ma meno nel trading dei warrant. La struttura dei costi produce un valore netto per azione pari ad una media effettiva di 8,26 euro e una mediana effettiva di 8,51 euro, rendendo le AIM Italia SPAC meno costose rispetto alle SPAC statunitensi. La performance a lungo termine supera quella delle SPAC statunitensi. Questo Articolo tenta quindi di spiegare i risultati da una prospettiva regolamentare e conclude con brevi considerazioni di policy.
This Article firstly examines the regulatory landscape, particularly company law and securities regulation, that defines the incentive structure for a sample of 24 AIM Italia SPACs (Special Purpose Acquisition Companies) from 2011 to 2023. Our research secondly poses three empirical questions concerning the degree of participation by institutional versus retail investors in the secondary market of AIM Italia SPACs, the scale of their cost structure, and the long-term share price performance (over one, two, and three-year periods) of entities following the business combination from the effective merger date. Our findings reveal that retail investors, though excluded from SPAC IPOs, are actively engaged in SPAC share trading on the secondary market, but less so in warrant trading. The cost structure yields a net cash per share with an effective average of 8.26 Euro and effective median of 8.51 Euro, making AIM Italia SPACs less expensive than U.S. SPACs. The long-term performance surpasses that of the U.S. SPACs. This Article then attempts to explain the results from a regulatory perspective and concludes with brief policy considerations.