Abstract
We provide a phenomenological interpretation of the rise of responsibility as a key concept of contemporary ethics. If we consider the philosophical tradition at large, responsibility has emerged as a concern, or even the center of attention, of ethical reflection only in relatively recent times. How can we account for this emergence? We argue that today’s pervasive concern with responsibility envisages a responsibility that is constitutively “social,” and that the thus understood responsibility traces back to a more original trait of sense, which presently informs our relation to the world. This trait we call “responsive.” Hence, our contention is that, when in contemporary ethical discourse we speak of (social) responsibility, the latter has a fundamentally responsive character. The responsive character of the contemporary concept of responsibility is related to the appearance of a new kind of imperative, which we call “systemic.” Originating from the unique imperative of “the system of universal existence,” systemic imperatives have the form of factual urgencies, which, while demanding an urgent and effective response, exclude the scope of what traditional ethics conceives as the perfectibility of beings. Our diagnosis of responsive responsibility in the horizon of the systemic imperative is guided by the phenomenon of “original responsibility”, which we obtain from Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology. “Original responsibility” refers to the relation between man’s being and being itself. The form of this relation is that man’s being consists in a (needed) response to being itself. Based on this hermeneutic framework, we show how the kind of threat which informs the systemic imperative (here exemplified by Hans Jonas’s “ecological imperative”) holds in store the expectability of a new “perfection” of beings.