Abstract
The pervasive role of the executive in the legislative function finds an unprecedented amplification in the context of federal systems, hence the concept of “executive federalism”, with financial relations and, among these, equalization mechanisms representing an emblematic forerunner of this phenomenon. The decision to isolate this specific segment of federalism studies serves a twofold purpose. First, it allows us to investigate the role that remains to the elective assemblies in elaborating decisions in technical and complex areas like public finance. Second, it aims to analyze an area that is essential to the political autonomy of territorial authorities, thus allowing us to understand how these processes have developed and their effects on the institutional level. To test this preliminary assumption, the study investigates decision-making procedures on equalization mechanisms from a comparative and constitutional law perspective, with the ultimate aim to verify the magnitude of the executive drift in the different paradigms in action. Accordingly, the different federal systems of interest have been identified to portray the existing variety of ‘architectural’ solutions, ie., including in the spectrum of analysis the different paradigms that can be detected in federal systems around the globe. Against this line, the following cases will be investigated: Australia as the prototype of tax-revenue sharing on a ‘technical base’ (Commonwealth Grants Commission); Canada representing, in financial-related matters, the paradigm of federal-provincial diplomacy with little, if any, legal entrenchment; Germany as the prototype of tax-revenue sharing on a ‘legislative-assembly base’ (Bundestag+Bundesrat); and, finally, Spain with the quasi-constitutional institutionalization of the CPFF as a forum for intergovernmental financial relations.