Abstract
In this essay we propose notions of difference and equality as elements of a phenomenologically informed ethics. The proposed notions are tested on a diagnosis of inclusion, and, in particular, inclusive education, both of which are leading values in contemporary public moral discourse and in the formulation of related policies. The value of inclusive practices is commonly seen in the circumstance that they safeguard difference while granting equality and realize equality without curtailing difference, thus creating conditions in which human dignity is respected. We ask in what sense, that is, according to what understanding of equality and difference, this is true. Our conclusion is that “the value of inclusion” is at least compatible with a merely formal sense of equality, which, at the same time, effectively negates human difference. On the other hand, the proposed phenomenological notions of difference and equality seem to provide an avenue towards a renewed understanding of the humanity of man, as well as of (inclusive) education as a manner of fostering that humanity. The interpretive framework for our analysis is given by Heidegger’s diagnosis of nihilism. The latter implies a notion of “values” as conditions of a dynamic of empowerment which has the “drive to more” as its intrinsic, constitutive motive.