Abstract
The main aim of the paper is to investigate whether subnational government participation can be considered as one of the determinants of a successful equalization program. This is done resorting to the theories of ‘contestatory federalism’ and adapting them to the dynamics of inter-territorial solidarity on a case-study base.
Equalization mechanisms can be described as a transfer of fiscal resources across jurisdictions with the aim of offsetting horizontal imbalances, i.e., differences in revenue raising capacity or public service cost. Although this is the mainstream trajectory of investigation, equalization mechanisms could also be investigated from a different viewpoint, that is as a tool to manage intergovernmental conflicts. Adopting the latter perspective, in fact, it emerges that redistribution schemes are conflictual by nature. There is an inherent paradox to equalization: on the one hand, interterritorial disparities might challenge the cohesion and unity of the system, but on the other hand, the same redistribution of resources does give rise to intergovernmental conflicts.
The success of equalization mechanisms in governing these dynamics - reducing the gap, while guaranteeing a certain stability - varies from one case to another. Our study adopts this second standpoint and investigates existing equalization mechanisms within the context of those constitutional theories of federalism that explore the concepts of dynamic equilibrium, and contestatory federalism. In doing so the role of federal constitutional frameworks and in particular of institutions and rules ensuring the involvement of subnational governments in a selection of cases is the main focus of analysis following the premise that procedural and institutional dimensions of equalization schemes in federal systems impinge the degree of acceptance of the rules governing the program and, thus, its success.