Abstract
The Conference aims at integrating the discussion on the role of fiscal constitutions -understood in a broad sense- as a determinant, among other factors, not only of financial relations but also of the inherent dynamics of a federal system (Palermo and Kössler 2017). The starting point is that the degree of fiscal decentralization and the increase of interregional disparities might play a key-role in exacerbating conflicts. To be investigated is however if and to what extent these elements are also determinants in sparking secessionist/nationalist claims, and this is done putting financial relations into the broader context of the federal structure of a certain system. In order to do this, the Conference will explore the rationale and the managing of intergovernmental conflicts on finances within a selection of states, integrating in the analysis the internal dynamics that result from them. This is done on the assumption that a process designed to accommodate a subnational entity could have negative repercussions on other subunits, creating a sentiment of alienation and hindering future process of ratification or implementation in legal or constitutional form. Thus, the Conference endeavors to shed light into the role that fiscal federalism plays in diversity accommodation in multilevel states whether their regional or federal nature. With this purpose in mind, it will explore and assess the role of fiscal arrangements as a tool of territorial integration (versus disintegration), with special emphasis on determining if and to what extent different types of these arrangements can be conceived as an instrument to reduce (or enhance) territorial tensions and accommodate diversity. These elements will be addressed from a comparative perspective, featuring several representative case studies and focusing on the different aspects and components fiscal constitutions are built on, with the ultimate aim to investigate their impact on diversity accommodation.