Now showing items 1-5 of 5

    • Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy? 

      Roberti P (2019)
      This paper analyzes a model of electoral competition with uncertainty on the policy implemented by candidates. I show that this uncertainty can induce risk-averse voters to elect politicians whose policies are biased. I ...
    • Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters! 

      Fedele A; Naticchioni P (2013)
      We study self-selection into politics and commitment once in office of citizens with different abilities and motivations in a framework where moonlighting is allowed. We find that high-ability motivated (public-fit) ...
    • Politicians’ coherence and government debt 

      Bellettini G; Roberti P (Springer New York LLC, 2019)
      We model a society that values coherence between the long-term commitment of politicians to given levels of public good provision and current policy. In that context, we suggest a novel mechanism by which issuing government ...
    • Populism and institutional capture 

      Chesterley N; Roberti P (Elsevier B.V., 2018)
      This paper analyzes the relationship between populism and institutional capture. Populist politicians provide voters with a utility boom followed by a subsequent bust. Non-populists provide a constant level of utility. ...
    • State capacity and repression: A model of colonial rule 

      Roberti P (Elsevier B.V., 2019)
      State capacity in colonial regimes can have spillover effects on the welfare of citizens if the colonizer is removed. This work shows that when spillovers are positive, investments in state capacity and repression by the ...